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1 Introduction
There are many examples of governments saving ailing rms from bankruptcy in recent
history. The most emblematic example of private corporate bailout is certainly the federal
bailout of the Big Three US automakers in 2009, but many rescue plans have been decided
in other countries and industrial sectors over the past decades. Not only rms operating
in the private sector receive bailout money; oftentimes, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
are concerned. SOEs have come back to the forefront as key players in the global trade
and are often granted advantages that can a¤ect export competition.1
Usually, bailouts are granted to rms public or private with structurally high pro-
duction costs.2 Regarding the 2009 US auto bailout, Goolsbee and Krueger (2015, p. 6)
underline that when including the legacy costs or retirees, average labor costs for the Big
Three were almost 45 percent higher than in the transplants. In addition, a surprisingly
large share of labor compensation for the Big Three automakers was a xed cost. There is
also a long-standing literature showing that SOEs are often more labor intensive and less
e¢ cient than foreign rms operating in the same sectors (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001;
Gupta, 2005; Golden et al., 2008 among others). SOEs often incur high xed costs reect-
ing bureaucratic overheads and legacy costs inherited from the past such as the nancing
of civil servant pension schemes (Kowalski et al., 2013).3 Finally, manufacturing rms
that benet from rescue plans are often large rms, so that their survival or bankruptcy
may induce important distortions.4 Wollman (2018) provides empirical evidence for such
distortive e¤ects by exploring the consequences of the 2009 rescue plan of US automobile
industry. Using data on the commercial vehicle segment of the US automotive industry, he
nds that if the government had not rescued automakers, markups would have drastically
increased while output would have dropped.5 Those potential distortions also concern
1In the business year 2010-2011, 10% of the 2000 worlds largest rms on the Forbes Global list were
identied as SOEs. These rms compete with private rms in the global market place and are present in
a wide range of manufacturing sectors. The only manufacture of motor vehicles accounts for nearly 12%
of world trade and displays a share of SOEs as high as 20%.
2Those high cost rms are even more vulnerable in the context of economic downturns, hence encour-
aging governments to avoid them going bankrupt.
3Despite the fact that progress has been made in the recent period to separate commercial activities
from the provision of public services, SOEs still have to bear higher xed and variable costs than private
rms.
4In Europe, such distortions on prices and market shares legitimate that all state aids for rescue and
restructuring must be authorized by the European Commission, sometimes by requiring compensatory
measures.
5Importantly, Wollman (2018) shows that this conclusion remains valid whether the alternative sce-
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ailing SOEs, given their rising importance in world markets. As emphasized in Kowalski
et al. (2013, p.13), private owned enterprises frequently nd themselves competing with
SOEs, both domestically and internationally. Given that rms in international markets
are often more productive (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004), SOE-related distortions
in contestable international markets may be associated with higher welfare costs as com-
pared to distortions in closed markets(Kowalski and Perepechay, 2015, p.15).6
The purpose of this paper is to study how the decision of policy makers to rescue ailing
rms may be shaped by economic integration taking these potential distortive e¤ects into
account. To the best of our knowledge, this question has been mostly ignored by the
literature. Most of the long-standing Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) literature looks at
identifying the key determinants of nancial bailouts in a closed economy framework
(Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003). Politicians may be motivated to grant subsidies
to companies in nancial di¢ culties for electoral reasons (Robinson and Torvik, 2001).
Policy-makers may also be concerned by a too big to fail argument when failures cause
negative spillovers and disruptive systemic e¤ects on the rest of the economy (Kornai et
al., 2003; Goolsbee and Krueger, 2014).
We enrich this existing literature by analyzing how two driving forces of economic
integration - namely rm mobility and trade integration - inuence the costs and benets
of a bailout. On the one hand, the decision for policymakers to rescue rms in nancial
trouble might be motivated by the fear that the bankruptcy of ailing rms could induce
distortive e¤ects on the goods markets, which would harm consumers by raising prices.
Interestingly, this adverse e¤ect of corporate bankruptcy on consumersmight be exac-
erbated when trade costs are low in so far as it strengthens competition on the goods
market. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of a bailout in terms of public good
provision is linked to the intensity of international tax competition. Indeed, whether res-
cuing ailing rms is likely or not to engender tax revenue losses depends on the ability of
governments to raise tax revenues, which ultimately depends on whether rms are mo-
bile or not. Surprisingly, despite the public policy implications of this question, we are
not aware of existing studies that provide an analysis of the possible impact of economic
integration on the frequency of such corporate bailouts.
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical contribution on the determinants
of corporate bailouts is that of Faccio, Masulis and Mc Connell (2006). Besides the
nario were bankruptcy of ailing rms, or their acquisition by a competitor.
6Interestingly, the (late) Trans-pacic partnership (TPP) included provisions aimed at making com-
petition between SOEs and private enterprises as fair as possible.
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importance of political connections between rms and the governments, they show that
larger rms, or rms that have been owned by the government in the past, are more
likely to be bailed out. On the theoretical side, contributions are also very scarce. An
important contribution by Qian and Roland (1998) explores the determinants of the SBC
in the context of federal economies. They show that by inducing scal competition among
local governments, factor mobility increases the opportunity costs of bailout and then
serves as a commitment device (Qian and Roland, 1998, p. 1143). However, their model
is designed to analyze bailout within the framework of a perfectly integrated national
economy. More recently, Alexeev and Jang (2010) develop a SBC model using a Melitz
(2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive
rms. The authors show that by raising the level of e¤ort made by rms in order to cut
their marginal production costs, trade liberalization reduces the number of rms eligible
for a bailout and therefore moderates the ine¢ ciencies introduced by the SBC7. However,
the bailout policy is considered as exogenous. In addition, the authors ignore the market
distortions that bailout policies are reputed to generate by assuming that rescue plans do
not signicantly a¤ect the aggregate price index and aggregate prot in the economy
(Alexeev and Jang, 2010, p. 452) .
In contrast, we develop a two country model of international trade where, given the
existence of ailing domestic rms that compete with foreign rms, the government has
to decide whether or not to adopt a bailout policy. We consider that there are two
kinds of enterprises: Foreign Owned Enterprises (FOEs) and Domestic Owned Enterprises
(DOEs). Following Gaigné and Wooton (2011), the former are mobile and owned by
investors residing in a third country while the latter are domestic and immobile. They
all compete on the same oligopolistic market, but they di¤er in their production costs.
Importantly, FOEs have low production costs and are always protable while DOEs are
high cost rms and are protable only when they benet from a nancial support on the
part of their government. Both kinds of rm export part of their production to the foreign
market and are subject to trade costs. Governments levy a source-based corporate tax on
the prots of FOEs. Those tax revenues are used to produce a public good which benets
the domestic households. Governments may also use part of their tax revenues to cancel
out the decit of DOEs through a subsidy (bailout policy). Governments are thus faced
with two sequential choices: in a rst stage they have to decide whether to bail out rms
7In Alexeev and Jang (2010), the marginal cost of production is endogenized by the level of e¤ort
made by the rm after entry and prior to production. Thus, the marginal cost is a decreasing function
of the e¤ort level.
4
or not and, in a second stage, they choose their corporate tax in a context where countries
compete with each other to attract foreign rms. Those rms decide in which country
to settle at the third stage of the game. For sake of simplicity, we assume benevolent
governments and disregard political benets or employment issues that might, in the real
world, also matter for governments.8 Therefore, the decision whether or not to rescue
ailing rms results from a trade-o¤ between the costs and benets of a bailout versus
laissez-faire policy. The cost of a bailout is composed of both the nancial cost of the
subsidies granted to the DOEs and a potential opportunity cost in terms of tax revenues
forgone, whereas the benets result from abating the distortive e¤ects that would harm
consumers surplus under the alternative scenario of a bankruptcy.
Our central result is that the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to
adopt a bailout policy. To obtain this result, we proceed in two steps. First, we analyze
what would be the decision of government with respect to ine¢ cient domestic rms if
competing FOEs were immobile as well. In that case, the tax base elasticity is equal to
zero so that governments can tax away all the prots of foreign rms. If the DOEs go
bankrupt, the prots made by FOEs are higher, which allows the governments to raise
higher tax revenues. However, there is also an incentive to bail out DOEs because their
survival raises the consumers surplus through a competition e¤ect on the good market.
In the end, the bailout decision depends on the country size. Below a certain population
size, governments decide to rescue rms if and only if the xed cost of production for
DOEs is low enough and trade cost are high enough. By contrast, governments of large
countries always decide to let DOEs go bankrupt because tax revenues arising from FOEs
and the related benets in terms of public good provision are magnied by the countries
size.
Second, we solve the model when FOEs are mobile and governments compete over
their corporate taxes to attract rms. We rst show that corporate taxes are higher
under the bailout scenario if country size is large enough. The intuition behind this result
is that an increase in the corporate tax reduces the tax attractiveness of the country. This
reduces the intensity of competition between local DOEs and mobile FOEs, which in turn
limits the level of decit that governments will have to cover through the rescue aid. In
other words, governments may strategically compete less ercely for FOEs in order to
protect local DOEs from competition and ensure that the nancial cost of the bailout is
acceptable. Importantly, this incentive to set higher tax rates is strengthened for larger
8However, we can extend our model, without changing qualitatively our result by assuming that
governments also aim at defending extra salaries in DOEs (see section 5).
5
countries because the positive impact of a foreign capital outow on operating prots of
DOEs (and by incidence the reduction of the nancial cost of the bailout) is increasing
with country size. This provides governments with an additional incentive to rescue rms.
In the end, we show that whatever country size, governments decide to bailout DOEs if
and only if their level of xed cost is lower than a certain threshold. Finally, we verify that
the minimum level of xed cost below which rescuing DOEs becomes welfare enhancing
is higher when FOEs are mobile than when they are immobile. Therefore, whatever the
country size, the presence of mobile FOEs always makes governments more prone to adopt
a bailout policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a basic model
with trade but assuming that FOEs are immobile. This section is used as a benchmark.
Then, in section 3 we introduce the possibility for FOEs to relocate and for governments
to set their corporate tax strategically in order to analyze how rm mobility inuences
governments incentives to rescue ailing rms. Section 4 provides some extensions and
robustness checks to our model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of two countries, labelled i = A;B, equally populated by LA =
LB = L=2 immobile individuals.9 There are two production factors, labor and capi-
tal. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor and works in its country of
residence. There are two private sectors: a manufacturing and a traditional sector. In
the manufacturing (M) sector, rms produce a homogeneous good, labelled x, in an
oligopolistic market using both labor and capital that may be owned domestically or by
foreign investors living in a third country. In the traditional (T ) sector, rms produce the
numeraire commodity z under conditions of perfect competition, using labor exclusively.10
2.1 Firms
The M sector is characterized by a xed number of m + n oligopolistic rms. They
produce an industrial good for both the domestic and foreign markets. The two countries
are then bilateral trading partners. Exporting this good involves a per-unit cost of  units
9Voluntarily, we restrict our study to the symmetric case. This allows us to control for any comparative
advantage that would intervene in a bailout decision.
10Both sectors are always active in each one of the two countries.
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of numeraire. Each of these rms possesses one unit of knowledge capitalso that rms
in the manufacturing sector enjoy increasing returns to scale. This factor is indispensable
for production, but available in limited quantity such that at most m+ n rms engage in
production. Importantly, we assume that there are two types of rms depending on the
origin of capital ownership. There are m foreign enterprises (Foreign-Owned Enterprises
or FOEs) based in a third country and prepared to invest by setting up a single production
plant in country A or B, and n domestic rms (hereafter Domestic-Owned Enterprises or
DOEs) whose capital owners are either the State or residents (or a mix of both) of the
country in which they are settled.
Through these simple modelling assumptions, we want to capture how governments
behave with respect to ine¢ cient DOEs that compete with foreign rms in an international
oligopolistic market. Importantly, DOEs and FOEs di¤er with respect to their level of
protability and their ability to relocate their production. Firstly, foreign rms are mobile
across countries in that foreign investors invest their capital freely in country A or B. By
contrast, domestic rms are immobile and we assume that they are equally distributed
across countries. Secondly, we assume that DOEs are less productive.11 Their marginal
cost is equal to c units of labor in DOEs, with c > 0. By contrast, the marginal cost
in FOEs is lower and normalized to zero. Thus, DOEs compete with rms producing at
a lower marginal cost. Moreover, DOEs bear an additional xed cost equal to  units
of the numéraire.12 We assume that because of these higher marginal and xed costs,
DOEs encounter nancial di¢ culties. They will go bankrupt, unless the governments bail
them out. We model this bailout in a simple way by assuming that it takes the form
of a lump-sum subsidy S such that rms make non-negative prots, allowing them to
survive and sell on both the domestic and foreign markets. Put di¤erently, we consider
bailouts that take the form of temporary liquidities (such as rescue aid in the EU) rather
than a restructing plan aimed at restoring the protability of the rm by requiring a
technological change that minimize the production costs.
In the T sector, rms produce the numeraire commodity z under perfect competition
using workers only. Specically, one unit of labour is required to produce one unit of
output. Moreover, this good is assumed to be freely traded. Therefore, free trade in the
11In case those DOEs are (at least partially) owned by the government, this assumption is consistent
with the empirical evidence showing that SOEs are often less productive and more labor intensive than
private enterprises (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001, and Gupta, 2005).
12In case those DOEs are owned by the government, this cost reects the bureaucratic overhead includ-
ing corporate governance supervision by the public administration or the management of civil servants
directly or indirectly devoted to the activity of the rm.
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numeraire good equalises the wage to one in each country. Finally, we consider that the
T sector is always active in both countries so that labor mobility across sectors equalizes
wages to unity in each country.
2.2 Governments
The public sector in each country is represented by a benevolent government levying a per
unit tax ti on prots made by foreign rms of the M-industry. This tax is levied on the
source principle, which means that governments only tax rms located in their country.
By assumption, DOEs make negative prots in the absence of government intervention.
Therefore they are not subject to the corporate tax.
Tax revenues from FOEs are recycled in a public good provision Gi for domestic house-
holds, using the numéraire as the only input so that the marginal rate of transformation
between the public good and the numéraire is unity. Let  indicate whether the gov-
ernment rescues DOEs through a subsidy ( = R for rescue) or whether it lets them
go bankupt ( = F for failure). The budget constraint of the country is government
writes:
GFi = t
F
i m
F
i in case of laissez-faire policy (1)
GRi +
n
2
SRi = t
R
i m
R
i in case of bailout policy (2)
with mi the number of foreign rms settled in country i, and S
R
i the amount of rescue aid
dened hereafter. Note that the level of public good provision under a bailout policy is
reduced by the amount of expenditures in subsidies. Therefore, there might be a trade-o¤
between two destinations of public expenditures, one (the bailout subsidy) sustaining the
economic activity, the other (the public good) directly beneting to consumers. Note also
that the level of tax will directly depend on the bailout decision.
Given the mobility of foreign rms, the two governments not only decide whether
or not to rescue ailing DOEs, they also compete for the investment of foreign-owned
rms. Therefore, our model shares common features with Gaigné and Wooton (2011),
who analyse tax policies with respect to mobile vs. immobile rms when governments
can set di¤erent tax rates on di¤erent tax bases.
2.3 Consumers
Individuals share identical preferences given by a quasi-linear utility function:
ui = ax

i  
1
2
 
xi
2
+ zi +G

i (3)
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where xi and z

i stand for the consumption of the manufacturing good and the numeraire,
respectively, whereas Gi stands for the public good supply in country i. Private good
consumption is impacted by the decision of governments to bailout DOEs, through its
inuence on the market structure and on the equilibrium prices.
The budget constraint for a representative consumer in each country i is then:
1 + z = zi + p

ix

i
where the wage is equal to unity, pi is the price of the good produced in the M-sector,
and z is the individual endowment in the numeraire.
2.4 Sequence of events
Our model contains various forms of interactions embedded in the following sequential
game (see Figure 1):
Stage 1 [Bailout or laissez-faire policy]. Governments decide independently whether
to rescue ailing rms through a full tax exemption and a subsidy (bailout policy), or to let
them go bankrupt (laissez-faire policy)13. When doing so, they perfectly anticipate the
tax competition outcome, the location of foreign rms and the resulting market outcome.
Stage 2 [Taxation of foreign rms]. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose the level of lump-sum tax on FOEs according to the source principle, given the
decision taken at stage 1 and anticipating the impact of their tax choice on the location
of foreign rms as well as the market outcome.
Stage 3 [Location of foreign rms]. Foreign capital owners decide whether to invest
in country A or B given the observed levels of taxation in each country and anticipating
the market outcome. The location equilibrium is dened by the share of foreign rms
located in country A, that is .
Stage 4 [Production and consumption]. Surviving rms make their output choices and
consumption takes place. The remaining rms go bankrupt. This results in an equilibrium
price p in the M sector.
The sequence of events from stage 2 to stage 4 is standard in tax competition models
(Hauer and Wooton, 2010; Ottaviano and Van Ypersele, 2005; Gaigné and Wooton,
2010). We incorporate the bailout decision at stage 1 of the game because one may con-
sider that a bailout decision should be less frequent than tax adjustments. In section 5,
13Because DOEs are immobile, there is no reason to consider that governments behave non-
cooperatively in the rst stage of the game.
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we describe the results under alternative timing of events. The solution to such a sequen-
tial game is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that we obtain by backward
induction beginning with the last stage of the game.14
Figure 1: Structure of the game
3 Bailout vs. Laissez faire with immobile foreign rms
In this section, we analyze how production and consumption choices made in the last
stage are inuenced by the laissez-faire vs. bailout decision, when FOEs are immobile
and equally distributed across countries (that is, mi = m=2 in each country, for all ).
This benchmark case corresponds to a situation where governments have no attractiveness
concerns when evaluating the opportunity of granting a rescue aid to DOEs. The impact
of rm mobility is evaluated in section 4.
3.1 Consumption and production in the private sector
Utility maximization leads to the individual inverse demand function with respect to the
manufacturing good:
pi = a  xi (4)
Aggregating the demand over all consumers yields market demand curves for each country
i in the oligopolistic industry :
Xi =
L
2
 
a  pi

14Because of the symmetry of our model, the equilibrium outcome is the same in each country.
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whereas the demand for numéraire good is residual.
Now let us analyse output decisions in the manufacturing sector. We assume manufac-
turing rms compete in quantities. Before describing their output choices, two comments
are in order.
Firstly, it is worth stressing that the number of competitors on the market, and thus
the toughness of competition is closely related with the bailing-out decision of governments
(see Table 1). Neglecting this market structure e¤ect would lead to an incomplete picture
of the criteria entering a bailing-out decision.
Table 1: Number and type of rms
If governments decide to adopt a laissez-faire policy ( = F ), DOEs go bankrupt
and there will be oligopolistic competition among m FOEs. If governments decide to bail
DOEs out ( = R), there will be oligopolistic competition amongm+n asymmetric rms:
m high-cost DOEs, and n low-cost FOEs. Therefore, unlike Alexeev and Jang (2010),
our model accounts for the e¤ects of a bailout policy on the market outcomes in so far as
each conguration described above will lead to specic prices and quantities.
Secondly, the level of trade liberalization shapes output decisions. Indeed, the cost
incurred by a rm for exporting each unit of the manufacturing good is equal to  units
of the numeraire.15
We are now equipped to describe the product market outcome. Firms are able to
segment their markets, choosing the quantities to sell on their domestic and export mar-
kets independently. Let xk;ii and x
k;
ij denote the output choices made by a rm of type
k located in country i to sell its good in the domestic and foreign country, respectively.
Production directly depends on the type of rm (k = FOE, or k = DOE) through
its inuence on the marginal cost. Moreover, the output choices are inuenced indirectly
by the bailout decision  through its impact on the number of surviving rms and the
toughness of competition.
Following Gaigné and Wooton (2011) and Hauer and Wooton (2010), the total op-
erating prot of a FOE equals the before-tax return to the required unit of knowledge
15This captures all frictions making bilateral trade costly including transport costs or administrative
barriers to the free mobility of goods between countries.
11
capital, and is dened as:
FOE;i = p
FOE;
i x
FOE;
ii +

pFOE;j   

xFOE;ij (5)
Because DOEs bear an additional xed cost in numéraire, the before-subsidy return
to the required unit of knowledge capital is equal to their total operating prot minus the
additional xed cost. As we are interested in the behavior of governments with respect
to rms making losses, we assume that before the taxation and bailout decisions,
DOEi   < 0
with
DOE;i =

pDOE;i   c

xDOE;ii +

pDOE;j   c  

xDOE;ij
Therefore, DOEs will go bankrupt without any intervention from the government. In
order to rescue these rms, the government has to o¤er a minimum amount of subsidy
S such that after the susbidy is granted, the return to capital become non-negative, that
is S =    DOEi . This assumption is consistent with the conventional wisdom in most
countries. For example, the guidelines on state aid for the rescue and the restructuring
of rms in di¢ culties in the European Union include a principle of proportionality (aid
limited to the minimum).16
Let us now analyse the production outcome, for given taxes and bailout policies. In
the short-run, the corporate tax has no impact on the production outcome because it is
lump-sum.17 By contrast, the production outcome varies depending on the attitude of
the governments with respect to their ailing DOEs. Maximizing before-tax prots with
respect to quantities given the inverse demand function (4), we get the following output
levels for a FOE:
xFOE;ii =
L
2
pi and x
FOE;
ij =
L
2
 
pj   

(6)
Output levels for a DOE are given by:
xDOE;Rii =
L
2
 
pRi   c

and xDOE;Rij =
L
2
 
pRj   c  

(7)
in case of a bailout whereas xDOE;Fii = x
DOE;F
ij = 0 if the government does not rescue the
rms.
16See the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-nancial undertakings in di¢ culty:
Rescue aid must be restricted to the amount needed to keep the beneciary in business for six months...
(European Commission, 2014/C 249/01).
17However, corporate taxation will introduce a distorsion in the long-run when foreign investors will
decide whether to invest in country A or B.
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Equilibrium prices are obtained by inserting the equilibrium output choices (6) and
(7) in the market clearing conditions. The equilibrium prices are as follows:
pFi 
a+ m
2

m+ 1
(8)
pRi 
a+ cn+ 
 
m
2
+ n
2

m+ n+ 1
(9)
Then, we determine the trade feasibility conditions ensuring that exporting is always
protable for all types of rms whatever the decision of the government. We obtain the
following condition for the foreign rms located in i:
xFOE;Fij > 0 iif  < 
F = 2
a
m+ 2
and the same condition applies for rms located in country j. The trade feasibility
condition ensuring that domestic rms export is given by:
xDOE;Rij > 0 iif  < 
R = 2
a  c (m+ 1)
m+ n+ 2
and the same condition applies for rms located in country j. Hereafter, we assume that
a > amin  c (m+ 1) so that this trade condition is compatible with the presence of
trade costs. We check that the trade condition is more restrictive in the case of bailout
(R < F ). Starting from the highest possible level of trade cost (that is, F ), trade
liberalization will rst allow low-cost FOEs to export and it is only once trade costs reach
a lower threshold value (that is, R) that high-cost DOEs rescued by the government
will also begin to export. Given our focus on the attitude of governments with respect
to DOEs that are active on the global market, we will consider in what follows that the
most restrictive trade condition applies, that is  < R. Importantly, those conditions are
unchanged when FOEs are mobile because the symmetry of the model gives rise to the
same spatial allocation of rms across countries at the equilibrium. We summarise these
conditions by the following assumption.
Assumption 1 We assume that trade costs are lower than R = 2
a  c (m+ 1)
m+ n+ 2
, with
a > amin  c (m+ 1). Therefore, both FOEs and DOEs have an exporting activity.
Expressions of the market prices (8) and (9) reveal the presence of the distorsive e¤ect
arising from a bailout policy. On the one hand, the average marginal cost is higher under
bailout policy because surviving rms bear a higher marginal cost. On the other hand,
a bailout decision strengthens competition by raising the number of surviving rms as
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compared to the laissez-faire decision. The latter e¤ect dominates. We verify that under
Assumption 1, pRi < p
F
i . Thus, the decision to rescue ine¢ cient domestic rms exerts a
downward pressure on prices by contributing to a higher number of competitors on the
market, even though they are less productive.
Importantly, this result is consistent with the ndings of Wollman (2018) regarding
the impact of the US auto industry bailout in 2009. This is, to our knowledge, the only
paper that analyzes the consequences of a government rescue plan from the perspective
of industrial organization by comparing this outcome with a counterfactual such as bank-
ruptcy or acquisition. By estimating a structural model of the US commercial vehicle
market, the author shows that the exit of GM and Chrysler or their merger into a rival
(Ford or PACCAR) would have resulted in major markup increases due to the higher
market power of surviving rms.18
From eq. (6), (7), (8) and (9), we obtain the following equilibrium operating prots:
FOE;Fi =
L
4

(m+ 1)2
, FOE;Ri =
L
4
 
(m+ n+ 1)2
and DOE;Ri =
L
4


(m+ n+ 1)2
where, ,   and 
 are positive bundles of parameters dened in appendix A.1. We check
that:
FOE;Fi > 
FOE;R
i > 
DOE;R
i > 0
Intuitively, the operating prots made by FOEs are higher than those made by DOEs
rescued by the government. This results from the higher marginal cost in DOEs as
compared to FOEs. In addition, observe that the operating prots made by FOEs are
always higher if the governments do not rescue DOEs, because the exit of DOEs relaxes
competition in the M sector and raises the equilibrium price.
3.2 Tax policy
Each government is benevolent and maximises the overall welfare of residents given by
the sum of the total consumer surplus and the utility from public good provision:
W i =
L
2
 
CSi +G

i

(10)
The individual consumers surplus in each country is given by:
CSi =
1
2
 
a  pi
2
(11)
18In addition, they show that the possibility for surviving rms to introduce or withdraw products can
be decisive for the bailout decision (see Wollman, 2018).
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while public good provision is given by
GFi = t
F
i m (12)
in case of laissez-faire policy and
GRi = t
R
i m 
n
2
S (13)
in case of rescue policy, with S =   DOEi .
Observe that a bailout decision inuences both the consumers surplus, through its
impact on competition in the manufacturing sector, and public good provision through
its inuence on tax revenues and the nancial cost of the bailout.
Given the timing of events, the decision whether or not to rescue ailing rms () is
considered as given when governments set their tax policy. Moreover, they anticipate the
impact of their tax policy on the outcome on the product market when deciding upon
their tax policy. Recall that we assume in this section that FOEs are immobile, so that
there are no strategic interactions. Substituting the budget constraint (1) in (10) and
di¤erentiating the countrys welfare expression with respect to its own tax, we obtain the
following rst order condition for any country i:
dW i
dti
=
L
2
dGi
dti
=
L
2
mi > 0 (14)
When FOEs are immobile, the consumer surplus is independent of taxes so the tax
policy inuences the national welfare through its impact on public good provision only.
The immobility of FOEs leads to a corner solution such that governments grab all their
prots. We therefore obtain the following symmetric equilibrium corporate tax on FOEs
in each country:
t^F = FOE;F and t^R = FOE;R
Intuitively, in line with the results of Gaigné and Wooton (2011), governments tax away
the prots made by FOEs because their tax base elasticity is equal to zero and the return
to capital invested in FOEs accrue to individuals living in a third country.19
Importantly, the decision of the government to bailout DOE or not impacts the level
of prots extracted by the government. As the decision will induce di¤erent number of
19Of course this is an extreme case and the maximum corporate tax rate is never conscatory in the
reality. However, assuming that governments are faced with constitutional and more generally institu-
tional constraints, which prevent them from taxing away all the prots, would not change anything to
our reasoning.
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competitors, the resulting operating prots and the level of equillibrium taxes vary. Un-
surprisingly, we check that the most competitive conguration, which is the one resulting
from the decision to bailout DOEs, implies a lower tax level. Indeed, we have in each
country:
t^F   t^R = 1
4
Ln
R (m+ n+ 2)  
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
 > 0 (15)
with  = 2 (a (2m+ n+ 2) + cn (m+ 1))   (2m+ n+ 2)  > 0 for admissible values of
trade costs.
Proposition 1 Assume that FOEs cannot relocate and that assumption 1 holds. Then,
i) regardless of their bailout policy, the governments tax away all the FOEsprots;
ii) equilibrium corporate taxes are lower when governments decide to rescue the DOEs
than when they choose to let them go bankrupt.
Finally, we check that d
 
t^F   t^R =d < 0, meaning that trade integration tends to
increase the tax gap between tF and tR . Therefore, the decision not to rescue DOEs is
becoming more and more protable in terms of public good provision.
3.3 Bailout decision
We now analyze the rescue vs. laissez-faire decision taken by the government at the 1st
stage of the game. By doing this, the government anticipates the impact of its decision
on the tax outcome and the short-run equilibrium.
The sum spent to rescue each ailing rm is considered as exogenous by the government.
The intuition is that the government engages the minimum amount of subsidy that just
allows the rm to survive. This assumption is in line with the general consensus according
to which governments are incited not to give too much money to the ailing rm in order
to limit a potential moral hazard problem, which is well known in the literature about
the soft budget constraint (see Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003).
Therefore, the government decides whether or not to rescue ailing DOEs, given that
rescueing the rm would involve an individual subsidy SR =  DOEi . The government
is assumed to be benevolent, so it decides to rescue DOEs if and only if it leads to a higher
national welfare compared to a laissez-faire decision. The variation in welfare that would
result from a bailout decision is given by:
WR  W F = L
2
 
CSR   CSF +  GR  GF  (16)
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Thus, the di¤erence in national welfare between a bailout and a laissez-faire decision
depends on the sum of the di¤erence in consumerssurplus and the di¤erence in public
good provision.
The consumer surplus is higher under a bailout policy, thanks to its negative impact on
the equilibrium price level. However, public good provision is higher under a laissez-faire
policy because : i) corporate tax revenues are higher and ii) the budget devoted to public
good provision is not reduced by subsidies going to DOEs. Therefore, each government is
faced with a trade-o¤ between welfare gains of the bailout in terms of consumers surplus
and the cost of the bailout in terms of reduced public good provision.
Inserting all equilibrium variables in the above welfare di¤erential, we obtain that:
W^R T W^ F iif  S ^ = 	^
2 + ^   ^
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
where 	^, ^ and ^ are positive bundles of parameters given in appendix A.2.
Clearly, ^ is increasing with the level of trade costs, and is negative when trade costs
are equalized to zero. The maximum value of ^ is therefore given by ^

=R
. In appendix
A.2, we show that
^

=R
? 0 for all L 7 L^ = a (2m+ n (2m+ 1) + 2m
2) + c (m+ 1) (2m  n)
a ( 2m+mn  2) + c (m+ 1) (6m+mn+ 2m2 + 2)
When L < L^, the threshold value ^ is positive for all trade costs higher than ^ , the second
root of 	^ 2 + ^   ^.20 If however, L  L^, we verify that ^  0 for all admissible values
of trade costs so that the inequality  > ^ is checked and governments are incited to let
DOEs fail.
We summarize those results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Assume that FOEs are immobile and assumption 1 holds. Then:
i) For L < L^, each government decides to rescue local DOEs if and only if ^ <  5
R and  < ^. It lets them go bankrupt otherwise.
ii) For L  L^, each government let local DOEs go bankrupt whatever the level of trade
costs and xed costs.
In sum, there are two necessary (but not su¢ cient) conditions for a rescue plan to
be decided. First, high trade costs render the rescue more likely as d^=d > 0. This
is partly due to the fact that the consumer surplus is less sensitive to a variation of the
20The rst root is negative.
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number of competitors when bilateral trade is facilitated. As a consequence, the welfare
gain of a bailout policy decreases and the laissez-faire policy may become the best policy
option. In addition, the level of xed costs, that captures a part of the ine¢ ciency of
DOEs, matters through its inuence on the nancial cost of the bailout. Fixed costs have
to be low enough for a bailout policy to arise because it limits the detrimental impact on
public good provision.
However, both conditions are not su¢ cient for a bailout to occur. Country size (L) also
matters through its e¤ect on public good provision, which might be di¤erent depending
on whether bailout or laissez-faire is chosen.21 Indeed, recall that the operating prots
of FOEs and the level of corporate taxation grow with L. Thus, a larger market size
contributes to lower the nancial cost of a bailout (see equation 13). However, the market
size also increases the opportunity cost of the bailout in terms of tax revenues. Indeed, as
illustrated by (15), the governments ability to extract rent from FOEs, which is captured
by t^ = FOE;, rises more rapidly with the market size when  = F than when  = R,
because competition is less intense in the former case. Part ii) of Proposition 2 suggests
that the latter e¤ect dominates. In the end, it is never optimal to rescue DOEs from the
point of view of a large country (that is, when L  L^) because the opportunity cost of a
bailout in terms of tax revenues losses is too high.
4 Bailout vs laissez-faire decision with mobile foreign
rms
We now assume that FOEs are mobile in order to evaluate the impact of rm mobility
on the behavior of governments. By contrast, DOEs remain immobile. Therefore, in-
ternationally mobile FOEs and immobile DOEs compete in the oligopolistic sector (see
Gaigné and Wooton, 2011). As it is standard in the tax competition literature (see. Wil-
son, 1999), we assume that the location choice occurs after governments have set their
taxes, so that the tax base elasticity becomes negative. Therefore, the mobility of FOEs
will inuence the scal policy and the bailout decision that are taken in the long-run, by
anticipating their impact on the location of FOEs.
In what follows, we solve the game by backward induction. Section 4.1 analyses the
short-run outcome and the location decision. Then, we analyse how this location pattern
inuences the tax decision (section 4.2) and, in ne, the bailout decision (section 4.3.).
21By contrast, the di¤erence in individual consumers surplus is una¤ected by country size.
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4.1 Location decision
Let  = mA=m stand for the proportion of FOEs that locates in country A. In the short
run, equilibrium prices are now expressed as follows:
pFA 
a+
 
1  F m
m+ 1
pRA 
a+ cn+ 
  
1  Rm+ n
2

m+ n+ 1
(17)
and symmetric expressions hold for country B.
Observe that the prices now depend on the endogeneous spatial distribution of FOEs.
The higher the share of FOEs located within a country, the lower the price level in that
country (dpA=d
 < 0), and therefore the higher the consumers surplus. This e¤ect is
proportional to the level of trade costs, because trade costs act as a protection barrier
with respect to competition in the foreign market. When they decline, prices in each
country become less responsive to the number of local rms.
Moreover, competition is ercer when governments rescue DOEs, so that equilibrium
prices are less responsive to a change in the location of rms:
dpFA
dF
<
dpRA
dR
< 0
Recall that governments impose a lump-sum tax on prots made by foreign rms,
so that the after-tax prot made by FOEs located in country i is given by FOE;i   ti .
Foreign investors decide to invest in the most protable country. Therefore, the equilibrium
location  is governed by the spatial di¤erence in after-tax prot, that is:
 =

FOE;A   tA

 

FOE;B   tB

After inserting equilibrium prices and quantities in (5), we obtain:
F = tB   tA   L 2
 
2F   1m
m+ 1
R = tB   tA   L 2
 
2R   1m
m+ n+ 1
The location equilibrium, in case of failure or bailout respectively, can be dened as
the share of FOEs located in country A such that  = 0, that is:
F =
1
2
  1
2
m+ 1
Lm 2
(tA   tB) (18)
R =
1
2
  1
2
m+ n+ 1
Lm 2
(tA   tB)
19
These location equilibria are the result of two forces.
The rst one is standard and depicts a pro-competitive e¤ect. When a country hosts
new rms, incumbent rms face more competitors in their domestic market and fewer in
the other one. Thus, the domestic price falls while it rises in the other market. Because
domestic sales generate more revenues in the presence of trade costs, this e¤ect acts as a
dispersion force (d=dA < 0). Interestingly, the e¤ect is amplied when the number of
incumbent rms is low. Hence, the pro-competitive e¤ect is stronger when governments
decide not to rescue DOEs.
The second force results from the impact of the tax wedge tA   tB on the location
choice.22 A unilateral rise in corporate taxation in country i leads to an outow of rms
(d=dtA < 0). Moreover, as competition is ercer when  = R, FOEs are more responsive
to positive tax variations and the tax base erosion e¤ect is stronger (dR=dtRA < d
F=dtFA <
0). Thus, by inuencing the tax responsiveness of rms, our model displays a relationship
between the bail out decision and the ability to collect tax revenues. It is worth stressing
that the market size measured by L reduces this tax base erosion e¤ect, and this downward
e¤ect is amplied when governments decide to bail out DOEs (see. 18). As demonstrated
below, this property which recalls the key role of the market size for tax policy in presence
of mobile rms, will inuence the policy choice of governments with respect to ailing rms.
Finally, we also verify that the tax base erosion e¤ect is getting stronger when trade
costs fall because prices become less and less responsive to the spatial distribution of rms.
In other terms, gradual trade integration weakens the pro-competitive e¤ect, increasing
the weight of taxes in the capital location choice.
4.2 Tax policy
When deciding upon their tax policies, governments anticipate the repercussion of their
choice on the location of FOEs. As the corporate tax base is now elastic, governments
choose their tax policy non-cooperatively and independently. Substituting the budget
constraint (1) in (10) and di¤erentiating each countrys welfare expression with respect
to its own tax, we derive the following rst order conditions:
22Despite their lump-sum form, taxes distort investment choices through the spatial distribution of
FOEs.
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dW Fi
dtFi
=
L
2
[  dp
F
i
dtFi
 
a  pFi

| {z }
Consumer surplus e¤ect (-)
+ m(Fi + t
F
i
dFi
dtFi| {z })
Public good provision e¤ect
arising through tax revenues (+/-)
] (19)
dWRi
dtRi
=
L
2
[  dp
R
i
dtRi
 
a  pRi

| {z }
Consumer surplus e¤ect (-)
+ m(Ri + t
R
i
dRi
dtRi
)| {z }
Public good provision e¤ect
arising through tax revenues (+/-)
+
n
2
dDOEi
dtRi| {z }
Public good provision e¤ect
arising through the amount of subsidies (+)
]
(20)
Whatever the attitude of governments with respect to ailing rms ( = R or F ), an
unilateral tax rise exerts two qualitatively identical e¤ects on the national welfare.
The rst term captures the negative e¤ect of taxation on the consumers surplus.
Following an unilateral tax rise, some owners of FOEs will relocate their production in
the other country. This relocation relaxes the degree of competition on the domestic
market, thereby rising the equilibrium price (dpi =dt

i = 1=2L 8 )23. Nevertheless, recall
that the level of prices are lower and the consumer surplus initially higher when  = R.
Therefore, the negative consumer surplus e¤ect resulting from a positive tax variation is
then stronger in the case of a bailout policy. Thus, focusing on the consumer surplus,
governments have a stronger incentive to set a low level of taxation if they decide to rescue
DOEs.
The second term captures the standard taxation e¤ect on public good provision. For
a given spatial distribution of FOEs, a marginal increase in ti raises tax revenues and the
resulting level of public good provision. This provides governments with an incentive to
raise taxation, that is not impacted by the bailout decision at the symmetric equilibrium
(Ri = 
F
i = 1=2). Nevertheless, this e¤ect can be counterbalanced by a tax base erosion
e¤ect due to the relocation of some FOE in the other country. The latter e¤ect is stronger if
governments rescue DOEs because of ercer competition on the goods market (dR=dtRA <
dF=dtFA < 0). Therefore, because of a higher tax responsiveness, governments rescueing
DOEs are more incited to set a low level of taxation.
In sum, and as expected, these two rst e¤ects identied through the FOC illustrate
that capital mobility assumption sharply a¤ects the way tax choices are inuenced by
23Note that this e¤ect is not inuenced by the bailout decision, because the stronger price competition
e¤ect that could arise from the bankruptcy of FOEs (dpFA=d < dp
R
A=d < 0) is exactly compensated by
the weaker tax base erosion e¤ect (dR=dtRA < d
F =dtFA < 0).
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the bail-out decision. Deciding to rescue ailing rms impacts the market structure and
the competitive pressure, two elements that governments should internalise when they
set their optimal level of taxation on mobile rms. Summarising those two rst terms
of the FOC, it appears that the incentive to set a low tax is stronger for governments if
they decided, at the rst stage of the game, to rescue the DOEs. The intuition is that
ercer competition on the goods market both raises the consumer surplus and the tax
base elasticity.
But this is not the end of the story. It is worth stressing that when governments
decide to rescue DOEs, they implement a regime of tax discrimination as only mobile
rms are taxed. In a similar framework, Gaigné and Wooton (2011) dene the various
tax equilibria resulting from such a conguration. They show that being all competitors
on the same market, the tax choice on a category of rms impacts the protability of the
other one. Here, when making the bailout choice in the rst stage, governments cannot
ignore that their tax policy with respect to FOEs will inuence the degree of competition
faced by the DOEs, their operating prots, the cost of the bailout and by incidence,
the level of public good provision. This e¤ect is captured by the third component of
(20). Following a marginal positive variation of tRi , the relocation of some FOEs in the
foreign country relaxes competition on the domestic market. As a consequence, prices and
operating prots of DOEs increase (dDOEi =dt
R
i > 0). This reduces the level of decit
of DOEs, and the amount of subsidy necessary to rescue them. In other terms, the tax
policy acts here a as protection instrument, which relaxes competition faced by DOEs
and restores tax revenues in order to invest in public goods. Clearly, this new e¤ect
moderates the two e¤ects mentioned above that lead governments to set lower taxes when
 = R. Importantly, this incentive is more important for large countries because the
positive impact of a foreign capital outow on operating prots of DOEs is increasing
with country size. To sum up, following a positive variation of tax, the reduction of the
bailout cost is higher, the larger the market size. This nding will crucially matter to
understand the attitude of governments with respect to ailing rms.
Solving the rst order condition for each government and crossing the reaction func-
tions, we obtain the following symmetric Nash tax equilibrium:
~tF =
1
2
m
 + 2L + 2Lm   2a
(m+ 1)2
~tR =
1
2

(m+ n+ L (2m+ n) (m+ n+ 1))    2 (am+ an  cn)
(m+ n+ 1)2
In what follows, we restrict ourselves to the case where the resulting tax equilibrium
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allows governments to provide public goods. In other terms, we only retain positive tax
equilibria for the rest of the analysis. As we can see from the above expressions, taxes
are increasing with country and market size (L). Thus, ~tFand ~tR are positive when L is
large. Formally, we obtain:
~tF > 0 when L > ~LF =
1
2
2a  
 (m+ 1)
~tR > 0 when L > ~LR =
2am+ 2an  2cn m   n
 (2m+ n) (m+ n+ 1)
with ~LF > ~LR > 0 for  < R. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for both ~tF and ~tR to be
positive is that L > ~LF .
Whatever the attitude of governments with respect to DOEs, equilibrium taxes are
increasing with L. There exists a vast literature on tax competition showing that larger
countries set a higher tax on mobile capital, based on di¤erent theoretical backgrounds.
The fact that larger countries set higher corporate taxes was rst shown in the standard
tax competition literature that assumes perfectly competitive factor and product markets
(see Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson, 1991). Indeed, the cost of capital is less sensitive
to tax changes in a large country than in a small one because the former has a market
power on the world capital market, and then has an incentive to increase its tax rate in
order to push down the world net return on capital. More recently, Han et al. (2014)
showed that a small country set a lower tax due to its limited institutional capacity in
providing infrastructure services. Moreover, in a similar framework than ours assuming
increasing returns to scale and trade costs, Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Ottaviano and
Van Ypersele (2005) as well as Hauer and Wooton (2010) demonstrate that the need for
governments to cut taxes and sustain the attractiveness of their country decreases with
market size.24 Indeed, the country size reduces the tax base erosion that follows a positive
tax variation (see. 18).
We enrich this existing literature by showing that besides the latter e¤ect, govern-
ments that in the rst stage of the game decided to rescue DOEs have an additional
incentive to increase taxation which is proportional to the country size. As explained
above, governments may be less prompt to improve their tax attractiveness, because the
relocation of some foreign rms in the country would deteriorate the operating prots of
DOEs and this would raise the nancial cost of the bailout. As this e¤ect is amplied
when the population is larger, it contributes to explain why the condition on the market
24There is also empirical evidence that, on average, large countries set relatively higher tax rates than
smaller ones (Exbrayat and Geys, 2014; Azémar et al., 2015).
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size for ~t > 0 is more restrictive when  = F (that is L > ~LF > ~LR).
Whatever the bailout decision at stage 1, it is straightforward to check that ~tF and ~tR
are strictly increasing with  according to the above conditions. Put di¤erently, the tax
equilibrium arising from the two congurations reacts in the same way to trade integration.
Following a decline in trade costs, mobile rms are more responsive to tax variations, tax
competition becomes ercer and the resulting levels of taxation are lower.
Finally, observe that the tax equilibrium is no more restricted to corner solutions where
governments grab all the prots of FOEs. The level of equilibrium taxes remains lower
than operating prots when trade costs are not too high. To be precise, ~tF < FOE;F if
only if and only if  < ~F and tR < FOE;R if and only if  < ~R, with the values of ~F
and ~R being given in Appendix A.3. In what follows, we exclude the corner solution of
a full taxation of prots, a highly unrealistic conguration in a context of mobile rms.
Conditions for an interior tax equilibrium are summarised by the following assumption.
Assumption 2 When FOEs are mobile, we assume that  < min

~F ;~R

and L > ~LF .
This makes it sure that governments partially tax away FOEs prots, whatever their
decision with respect to ailing rms at stage 1 of the game.
The tax di¤erential between the bailout and the no-bailout case is given by:
~tR   ~tF = n
2 (m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
 (21)
where  = 2

a (mn+m2   1) + c (m+ 1)2  [L (m  1) (m+ 1) (m+ n+ 1) +m (m+ n)  1].
The sign of this tax gap is a priori ambiguous. We show that ~tR ? ~tF when L ? ~L
(cf. Proof in the appendix A.4), with
~L =
2 (m+ 1) (c  a+ am+ cm) + 2amn   (m2 + nm  1)
 (m  1) (m+ 1) (m+ n+ 1) 2
h
~LF ; +1
i
Remember that t^R < t^F when FOEs were assumed to be immobile. Thus, as expected,
tax decisions can be inuenced by the assumption of mobility of FOEs. Taxes become
higher under a bailout policy as soon as the level of population is high enough, thereby
reversing the sign of the tax di¤erential compared to a situation of rm immobility. This
is the direct consequence of the last term of equation (20), we discussed above. To avoid
a stronger deterioration of the operating prots of DOEs and limit the cost of the bailout,
governements raise taxation to reduce the countrys attractiveness. This e¤ect is more
important for larger countries. This explains why ~tR becomes higher than ~tF when country
size is higher than ~L.
This leads us to formulate the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 Assume that FOEs are mobile and assumption 2 holds. Then,
i) the equilibrium taxes correspond to an interior solution such that 0 < ~tF < FOE;F
and 0 < ~tR < FOE;R;
ii) equilibrium corporate taxes are higher when governments decide to rescue the DOEs
than when they choose to let them go bankrupt (~tR > ~tF ) if and only if the country size is
large enough (L > ~L).
A consequence from this proposition is that when FOEs are mobile, public good pro-
vision may be higher under a bailout policy. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition
is that country size is large (L > ~L) so that taxes are higher under a bailout policy. In
addition, the xed cost beared only by DOEs must be low enough to reduce the impact
of the nancial cost of the rescue plan on public good provision. Formally, we verify that:
GF < GR when L > ~L and  <
m
n
 
~tR   ~tF + DOE;R = 
GF > GR if L 6 ~L or if L > ~L and   
4.3 Bailout decision
We now analyze the governments trade-o¤ between the bailout and the laissez-faire poli-
cies, given its impact on equilibrium taxes, the location equilibrium, production and con-
sumption choices. The model being symmetric, the equilibrium location that results from
the above equilibrium taxes is also symmetric. It is also independant of the governments
decision with respect to ailing rms, that is: F = R = 1=2.
Each government compares the national welfare under a bailout vs. laissez-faire deci-
sion. Again, the variation in welfare that would result from a bailout decision is given by
the sum of the di¤erence in consumerssurplus and the di¤erence in public good provision
(16). As in the benchmark case with immobile FOEs, the attitude of governments with
respect to ailing rms will strongly depend on their country size.
Let us rst consider a large country, with L > ~L. If the xed cost level borne by ailing
DOEs is not too high (that is,  < ), then the public good provision is improved by
a rescue policy because ~tR > ~tF and the nancial cost of the bailout is limited. In that
case a bailout policy both raise the consumers surplus and improve public good provision,
so that governments decide to rescue DOEs. In addition, it is worth mentioning that
the increase in consumers surplus that results from the bailout is getting stronger as
trade costs fall (d
 
CSR   CSF  =d < 0). Stronger competition in the manufacturing
sector makes prices more responsive to the level of trade costs (dpR=d > dpF=d > 0),
25
so that the decline in prices due to a switch between a laissez-faire and a bailout policy
is increasing with trade integration. If however, xed costs are large and higher than
, governments are confronted with a trade-o¤ between sustaining a higher number of
competitors that lower the consumers price and reducing public good provision.
Let us now consider a small country, with L  ~L. Public good provision in those coun-
tries is always higher under a laissez-faire policy so that governments are confronted with
the same trade-o¤ as governments of large countries when their DOEs su¤er large xed
costs. The result of this trade-o¤ nally depends of the level of xed costs. Specically,
~WR ? ~W F if and only if  7
~	 2 + ~ + ~
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
= ~ > 0
with ~ >  for all admissible values of trade costs.
~	, ~ and ~ are bundles of parameters given in appendix A.5. ~	 and ~ can take a
positive or negative values, whereas we ckeck that ~ > 0. Thus, ~ is positive for zero
trade costs. We also verify that ~ is positive for the highest possible level of trade costs
R. As far as ~	 can be negative, we can conclude that ~ can be positive for all admissible
values of trade costs ( 2 0; R).25
We summarize the attitude of governments with respect to ailing rms by Proposition
4.
Proposition 4 Assume that FOEs are mobile, and that both assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Whatever the country size, governments decide to rescue ailing DOEs if and only if  < ~
whereas they let them go bankrupt otherwise.
The mobility of FOEs therefore inuences the attitude of governments with respect
to ailing DOEs, especially for large countries. When FOEs are immobile, those countries
always let DOEs go bankrupt because the opportunity costs of a bailout in terms of tax
revenue losses (related with the fact that governments grab all prots) are magnied by
country size. The mobility of FOEs engenders tax competition. Contrary to the bench-
mark case with immobile rms, tax competition gives rise to a higher level of tax revenues
in larger countries when the governments rescue DOEs, which provides governments with
an additional incentive to rescue DOEs.
25We cannot fully characterize the property of the function ~ () without making additionnal assump-
tions regarding the number of FOEs and DOEs. Nevertheless, we can show that the only conguration
under which ~ can be negative is if and only if i) ~	 > 0, ii) ~ < 0 and iii)  is neither too low nor too high
(see Appendix A.5). Under these very specic circumstances, governments would adopt a laissez-faire
policy whatever the level of xed cost. This does not call into question the conclusion in Proposition 5.
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Finally, let us analyze the impact of rm mobility on the behavior of governments
with respect to ailing rms. By comparing ~ and ^, we obtain:
~  ^ = m
n
  
~tS   ~tH   t^S   t^H
and we check that:
~ > ^ for all  2 0; R
By summarizing the results in Propositions 2 and 4, we thus verify that the mobility
of FOEs either relaxes the condition ensuring that rescuing DOEs is welfare enhancing
(when L < L^), or it leads governments to move from an unconditional laissez-faire policy
to a potential bailout policy conditional on the xed cost level (when L > L^).
This lead us to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Whatever the size of their coun-
try, governments are more prone to bail out DOEs if FOEs are mobile.
To understand why rm mobility makes governments more prone to adopt a bailout
policy, we can compare the welfare variation that results from a bailout vs. laissez-faire
policy if FOEs are immobile and if there are mobile. Because the spatial distribution of
FOEs is always symmetric in our model, the only welfare component that depends on
the mobility of FOEs is the impact of the bailout on corporate tax revenues arising from
FOEs26. Thus, the mobility of foreign rms makes governments more prone to adopt a
bailout policy because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of the bailout policy
in terms of public good provision.
5 Discussion
Although the model we develop is simple, the mechanisms behind the main results are at
work under various alternative assumptions.
One might wonder if our results remain valid if in the sequence of events, the bailout
decision is the second (rather than the rst) decision to be taken by governments. Gov-
ernments would rst set their tax policy (stage 1), then foreign investors would make
their location choice (stage 2), and governments would decide wether or not to rescue
ailing rms (stage 3) given the decisions at these previous stages. Under this alternative
26At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, neither the gains from a bailout in terms of consumers
surplus, nor the direct cost of the bailout are a¤ected by rm mobility.
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sequence of events, at the 2nd or 3rd stages of the game (depending on wether we consider
mobile or immobile FOEs) governments will opt for a laissez faire policy if the xed cost
of DOEs is higher than a threshold _ and this threshold would depend on taxes through
their inuence on the consumer surplus and public provision. At the 1st stage of the
game, government anticipate this result when they dene their tax policy, but the tax
outcome would result from the same trade-o¤ as those described in our benchmark as
location choices are always made after tax policy decisions. Therefore, once evaluated
at the subgame perfect equilibrium, the bailout decision would be identical to the one
described in our benchmark.
The level of employment and labor income might be another important reason why
governments are enclined to rescue some rms. In our baseline framework, even though
DOEs rms are more labor intensive, this has no impact on the bailout decision because
in the end, all workers are employed and earn the same wage. The reason is that even
if these rms go bankrupt, their employees will nd a new job in the numéraire sector.
While introducing unemployment in the model would complicate the analysis too much,
one approach to modelling this bailout motive could be to assume that workers employed
in the modern industry (therefore, in DOEs) receive a wage premium over what can
be earned in the numeraire sector (wage in sector M equal to , with  > 1). Said
di¤erently, this industry o¤ers better jobs. In that case, labor market clearing is such
that workers rst seek for a job in sector M and, if they do not nd, they look for a
job in sector T .27 Therefore, the national welfare under a bailout policy would include a
component with a wage premium multiplied by the number of individuals employed in
the M sector. Specically, the welfare di¤erential would writeWR W F = CSR CSF +
L
2
 
GR  GF  + LM, with LM the number of individuals employed in the M sector.28
Thus, this concern about labor income will provide an additional incentive to bailout
ailing rms in order to raise the level of agregate income. However, this does call into
question the other mechanisms behind the bailout decision and that operate through the
impact of the governments decision on the consumers surplus and public good provision.
Indeed, there are no income e¤ects in our model, so the demand function is still given
27We assume, that total labor supply is always higher than total labor demand coming from the M
industry so that there are always some workers employed in the T sector. Thus, the number of jobs in
the T sector (LT ) is equal to the di¤erence between national labor supply and national labor demand
coming from DOEs.
28LM is equal to total employment in DOEs. Each rm employs  workers as a xed cost and c
production workers by unit of the good procuded. Therefore, LM = n2

c

xDOE;Rii + x
DOE;R
ij

+ 

. We
check that for admissible values of parameters, LM < L2 so that the traditionnal sector remains active.
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by (4). While the wage premium exerts an additional upward pressure on prices under a
bailout decision, we verify that the downward pressure on prices due to the survival of
rms still make the price level lower under a bailout decision than under a laissez-faire
policy. Therefore, our main result regarding the incentive to bailout in order to raise the
consumer surplus remains valid, as well as results regarding the tax equilibrium.29 The
main di¤erence under this alternative modelling strategy concerns the impact of trade
integration on the incentives to bailout. At the equilibrium, trade liberalization raises
total output in the M sector, and therefore improves total labor income under a bailout
policy by increasing the level of employment in the high-wage sector. Interestingly, this
e¤ect completes the story of the baseline model by showing that trade liberalization may
exert an additional force that makes governments more enclined to bailout corporate rms
in order to raise the national labor income.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at analyzing the e¤ects of both trade integration and capital mobility on
the propensity for governments to bailout ine¢ cient domestic rms. Emphasis has been
laid on how bailouts a¤ect price competition and markups in oligopolistic markets. On the
one hand, bailouts entail costs in terms of public good provision but on the other hand,
they may allow to preserve competition, which benets domestic consumers. The latter
channel has been ignored by the existing theoretical literature on soft budget constraint,
which often explains such a phenomenon by electoral reasons and the too big to fail
argument. In addition, we show that both the benets and the costs of bailouts ultimately
depend on the extent to which international market are integrated and rms are mobile.
As explained in the paper, our point does not run encounter to standard explanations of
bailouts but, rather, is a complementary explanation. Interestingly, empirical evidence
in the US strongly suggests that recent bailouts in the car industry may have had huge
e¤ects on markups and outputs compared to a situation where GM and Chrysler would
have gone bankrupt (Wollman, 2018). Quite surprisingly, our main result is that mobility
of rms and international tax competition make governments more prone to bail out
rms. In a sense, our paper contributes also to the literature dealing with the e¤ects of
mobility on disciplining governments (Cai and Treisman, 2005). Our results suggest that
29Even when FOEs are mobile, the tax outcome is unchanged. Indeed, total production in DOEs is
independent on the location of FOEs because of the symmetry of the model. Therefore, at stage 1, the
presence of a wage premium in the objective function does not a¤ect tax choices.
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globalization may relax discipline, nevertheless it could be welfare improving thanks to
competition e¤ects.
A Appendix
A.1 Operating prots
The equilibrium operating prots in each country write as follows:
FOE;F =
1
4
L

(m+ 1)2
, FOE;R =
1
4
L
 
(m+ n+ 1)2
and DOE;R =
1
4
L


(m+ n+ 1)2
where
 =  2 (2m+m2 + 2) + 4a (a  )
  = (m2 + 2mn+ 2m+ n2 + 2n+ 2)  2 + 4 (a+ cn) (a   + cn)

 = (m2 + 2mn+ 2m+ n2 + 2n+ 2)  2 + 4 (a  c  cm) (a  c  cm  )
,   and 
 are all positive under Assumption 1.
A.2 Bailout decision when FOEs are immobile
Assume that FOEs are immobile. Then, W^R T W^ F if and only  S ^, where:
^ =
	^ 2 + ^   ^
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
and
	^ = 1
4
 
(m+ 1) (L (m+ 1)n2 + 2L+ 3Lm2 + Lm3 + 2Lm+ 2m)
+ (L (m+ 2) (2m+ 2m2 + 1) + 2m+ 1)n
!
^ = ((m2 + nm  1)L  (2m+ n+ 2mn+ 2m2)) a+ c (m+ 1)2 (L+m+ n)
^ = (a  amin)
 
(L (mn+m2   1)  2m (m+ n+ 1)  n) a
+c (m+ 1) (L+ n+ Lm (m+ n+ 2))
!
We verify that 	^, ^ et ^ are positive under Assumption 1 and for admissible values
of parameters (that is, L > 4, and m > 2).
Therefore, ^ is increasing in  and its maximum value is given by:
^

=R
= (a  amin) [a(2m mn+2) c(m+1)(6m+mn+2m
2+2)]L+(a(2m+1) c(m+1))n+2m(m+1)(a+c)
(m+1)2(m+n+2)2
with a amin > 0 and (a (2m+ 1)  c (m+ 1))n+2m (m+ 1) (a+ c) > 0 under Assump-
tion 1.
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We further assume that m > 2=(n  2), which means that the number of foreign rms
is not too low. Then, the numerator is decreasing with population size, and becomes
negative when:
L >
a (2m+ n (2m+ 1) + 2m2) + c (m+ 1) (2m  n)
a ( 2m+mn  2) + c (m+ 1) (6m+mn+ 2m2 + 2) = L^
Therefore,
^

=R
? 0 when L 7 L^
A.3 Equilibrium taxes when FOEs are immobile
When FOEs are mobile, we have to ensure that Nash taxes correspond to an interior
equilibrium so that prots made by FOEs are not entirely taxed.
Calculating the di¤erence between Nash taxes and operating prots, we obtain:
~tR   FOE;R = (2L(m 1)+3Lm
2+Ln2+4Lmn+2m+2n)2+4(a(L m n)+cn+Lcn) 4L(a+cn)2
4(m+n+1)2
~tF   FOE;F = 1
4
(2m+L(3m2+2m 2))2+4a(L m) 4La2
(m+1)2
The numerator in the above expressions is a quadratic function with respect to trade
costs.
Considering that the number of individuals in the economy is always higher than the
number of surviving rms, we verify that 4 (a (L m  n) + cn+ Lcn) and 4a (L m)
are positive. Therefore, ~tR   FOE;R and ~tF   FOE;F are increasing with trade costs.
Moreover, we check that these expressions are negative when  = 0 and positive at the
maximum value of trade cost R. Therefore, ~tR   FOE;R and ~tF   FOE;F are negative
if and only if trade cost values are lower than the second root of the numerator, wich are
respectively given by:
~F = 2a
p
(L2(m+1)(3m 1)+m2) (L m)
2m+L(3m2+2m 2)
and
~R = 2
q
(m+n+1)L((3m+n 1)(a+cn)2L+2cn(a+cn))+(am+an cn)2 a(L m n) cn(L+1)
2L(m 1)+L(3m+n)(m+n)+2m+2n
A.4 Equilibrium taxes when FOEs are mobile
When FOEs are mobile, the di¤erences in corporate tax that would result from the decision
not to rescue ailing rms is given by:
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~tF   ~tR = 1
2
n
(L(m 1)(m+1)(m+n+1)+mn+m2 1) 2((m+1)( a+am+cm+c)+amn)
(m+1)2(m+n+1)2
This expression is increasing with L. Therefore,
~tF > ~tR when L >
2(m+1)(c a+am+cm)+2amn (m2+nm 1)
(m 1)(m+1)(m+n+1) =
~L
and we check that ~L > ~LF .
Therefore, under Assumption 2,
~tF ? ~tR when L ? ~L
A.5 Bailout decision when FOEs are mobile
Assume that FOEs are mobile. Then, ~WR T ~W F if and only  S ~, where:
~ =
~	 2 + ~ + ~
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1)2
with
~	 = (m+ 1) ((m+ 1) (4m+ 2 m2 + n2)L  2m (m  2)) +n ((6L  2)m2 + (8L+ 2)m+ 2L+ 1)
~ = (m+ 1)2 (L+ 2m+ n+ Lm) c a  L (m+ 1)2 + 3m+ n m2n+ 2mn+ 2m2  m3
~ = (L+ 2m+ n+ Lm2 + 2Lm+ 2mn+ 2m2) a  c (m+ 1) (L+ n+ Lm2 + 2Lm)
The sign of ~	 and ~ cannot be derived analytically without making additional as-
sumptions regarding the number of FOEs and DOEs.
However, we verify that that ~ > 0 under Assumption 1, so that ~

=0
> 0.
Evaluating the threshold value ~ at the maximum trade cost value, we obtain:
~

=R
=
a  amin
(m+ 1)2 (m+ n+ 1) (m+ n+ 2)2

with  =
 
a [2 (m+ 1) (3m+ n+mn+ 1)L+ (4m3 + 6m2n+ 4m2 + 2mn2 + 5mn+ n2 + n)]
 c (m+ 1) [(6 (L  1) + 2Ln)m2 + (4 (2L  1) + n (4L  1))m+ (n+ 1) (2L+ n)]
!
We check that ~

=R
> 0 under Assumption 1.
The sign of ~ over the whole interval of admissible trade cost values

0; R

depends
on the value of ~	 and ~.
i) Assume that ~	 < 0 so that ~ is a hump-shaped function of trade cost.
Recall that ~

=0
and ~

=R
are positive.
Therefore, ~ is positive for all admissible trade values, whatever the sign of ~.
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ii) Assume that ~	 > 0. We have to consider two cases to characterise the sign of ~
over the interval

0; R

.
If ~ > 0, then ~ is increasing with trade costs and is positive for all admissible values
of trade costs.
If ~ < 0, then ~ reaches its minimum value for a positive value of trade cost  ~=2~	,
that might lie within the interval

0; R

. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the sign of
~

= ~=2 ~	
analytically. Therefore, in that specic conguration (~	 > 0 and ~ < 0)30, ~
can take negative values for intermediate levels of trade cost (between the two roots of
~	 2 + ~ + ~), whereas ~ is positive for either low or high trade cost levels.
To summarize, ~ is positive for all admissible values of trade costs when i) ~	 < 0,
or ii) ~	 > 0 and ~ > 0. Otherwise (that is, if and only if ~	 > 0 and ~ < 0), we verify
that ~ is positive for either low or high trade cost level, whereas it might be negative for
intermediate trade cost values.
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